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Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century, one of the 
most important indigenous uprisings in the history 
of Rapa Nui occurred in reaction to the oppressive 
living conditions and colonial domination of the island 
imposed by the Company in charge of its exploitation, 
the Compañía Explotadora de Isla de Pascua, or 
CEDIP.1 The rebellion, commonly referred to as the 
Angata Rebellion, occurred between May and July 
1914 and was described by various sources from the 
era, including a report written by the Armada, Professor 
Vives Solar’s article based on the Rapanui eye-witness 
accounts, and the testimony of Katherine Routledge 
(Hotus et al. 1988; Routledge 1919; Vives Solar 1917). 
Although it was brought to an end, the rebellion’s 
aftermath included a series of significant changes in 
the political structures of the colonial presence on the 
island (Hotus et al. 1988).2 
One product of the rebellion, responding to the need 
to create a new ‘colonial pact’ between the State, the 
Rapanui community, and the Company, was the Navy’s 
designation of a Maritime Subdelegate (Subdelegado 
Marítimo) that was independent of the CEDIP, or 
at least nominally so. Likewise, the signing of the 
“Temperamento Provisorio”, or “Provisional Code”, in 
1917 established a new contract between the Company 
and the State, reconfiguring the framework of the 
social relations on Rapa Nui. The “Provisional Code” 
had seven points in which the State imposed new rules 
and obligations for the Company in exchange for a free 
lease of the island. Only two of these seven points dealt 
with the islanders. The first declared that 2000 hectares 
of land were to be kept for the use of the Rapanui 
people and for public services. The second established 
the CEDIP’s obligation to grant the Rapanui – via the 
Subdelegate – access to the Company’s land for fishing 
practices and the collection of animal fuel. This new 
contract, provisional in theory, lasted effectively until 
February 1936. 
The first independent Subdelegate, who became 
the official representative of the State on Rapa Nui, was 
José Ignacio Vives Solar (1914-1917). His successors 
during the “Provisional Code” were Exequiel Acuña 
(1917-1921), Luis Zepeda (1921-1922), Exequiel 
Acuña for a second time (1922-1926), Carlos 
Recabarren (1926-1928), Carlos Millán (1928), Carlos 
Recabarren for a second time (1928-1931), Alberto 
Cumplido (1931), Eduardo Ávalos (1931-1933), 
Hernán Cornejo (1933-1935), and finally, Manuel 
Olalquiaga (1935-1936). 
This article aims to characterize the forms of 
colonial power on the island during this key period 
of 1917 to 1936, by reflecting on and analyzing the 
actions of both the Chilean State and the Company. 
We use archival sources from the Archive of the 
Maritime Ministry and the Archive of the Intendencia 
de Valparaíso as the foundation of our analysis.3 
This paper seeks to characterize the structure of colonial power on Rapa Nui from 1917 to 1936, the years of the 
so-called “Temperamento Provisorio” (“Provisional Code”). Based on the analysis of documents acquired from 
the archives of the Naval Ministry and the Administrative Division of Valparaíso, this study provides a reflection on 
the actions of the Chilean State and the “Compañia Explotadora de Isla de Pascua” during those years.
Este trabajo busca aportar con algunos elementos para una caracterización de la situación del poder colonial en 
Rapa Nui durante el periodo 1917-1936, los años del así llamado  “Temperamento Provisorio”. Teniendo por base 
la revisión de documentos provenientes del Archivo del Ministerio de Marina y del Archivo de la Intendencia de 
Valparaíso, llevaremos a cabo una reflexión en torno a la acción del Estado chileno y la “Compañía Explotadora 
de Isla de Pascua” durante estos años.
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The State
In order to characterize the State presence on Rapa 
Nui, one must go beyond the most obvious answer: 
colonialism. The particular nature of this Chilean 
colonial state is extremely relevant to understanding 
the dynamics of its relationships with the Company 
and the indigenous Rapanui.
One of the first issues that surges to the fore when 
considering these questions is the semi-colonial and 
somewhat stunted character of the annexing colonial 
power: Chile.4 In contrast to other colonial enterprises 
of the era, the Chilean presence in Polynesia stands out 
precisely for its precarious nature. During most of the 
period from 1917 to 1936, Rapa Nui was considered 
merely a legal territory (or territorio fiscal) of Chile 
that was turned over for exploitation to a private 
company owned by powerful foreign interests.5 During 
this time, though defensive of its political sovereignty 
over the island, the Chilean government was incapable 
of certifying public properties on the island, just as they 
were unable to require that the CEDIP pay rental fees 
for the utilization of lands and livestock on Rapa Nui 
(Vergara 1939; see also Porteous 1981).
However, despite these limitations, the actions 
of the State apparatus had a tremendous impact on 
the island.  The existence of permanent government 
institutions, charged with regulating of the lives of 
indigenous islanders, constituted a force that had 
a powerful impact on the social relations of the 
Rapanui population.  The periodic arrival of military 
functionaries, civil staff and professionals, and the 
annual arrival of Navy ships, combined with the latent 
threats of deportation, gave the State power a strong 
presence that was difficult to ignore (Foerster 2010). 
Overall, this State presence on Rapa Nui 
manifested itself in several different forms. One of the 
most important, according to sources from the era, was 
the annual arrival of naval missions. These missions 
informed the Maritime Ministry about the situation 
on the island, while also serving to ensure that local 
officials and the population obeyed the directives of 
the government. At the same time, they fulfilled the 
agreement between the State and the Company while 
carrying out other needed tasks.  For instance, they 
helped to resolve conflicts that had arisen between the 
population and authorities by carrying out summary 
investigations and collecting information from all 
parties involved in the conflicts. And, generally 
speaking, the decisions of naval commanders, backed 
up by armed contingents, had a resolute and definitive 
character, and were respected nearly across the board.
While they were short visits, the arrival of these 
naval missions resulted in a substantial strengthening 
of State institutions and power on the island. For 
several days, the commanders appeared to have the 
capacity to “resolve everything”, from questions of 
administrative order, to problems of a moral nature, 
such as the existence of “poorly constituted” Rapanui 
families. The following excerpt is from a visit of 
the Baquedano, under Captain Felipe Wiegand, in 
December 1921:6  
“Tan pronto se hubo fondeado en Hanga Roa viene a 
bordo el Sub-Delegado de la Isla y representante de la 
Casa Williamson Balfour […] Los Oficiales inician 
el cumplimiento de las comisiones recibidas que se 
distribuyen así: Capitan de Corbeta Sr. Fernández: 
Atención e investigación de los reclamos elevados 
por los nativos, tanto los escritos como aquellos 
verbales […] Contador Io. Sr. Astorga: Revisación 
de inventarios de los efectos fiscales y de las 
dependencias confeccionadas el año 1917. Cirujano 
Io. Sr. Merino: Exámen sobre la propagación de 
la avariosis entre los nativos y el mismo sobre la 
lepra y sí los leprosos recluídos en la leprosería 
son atendidos conforme al acuerdo vijente del año 
17 por la Comisión consultiva de la isla. Capellán 
Sr. Fermandois: Fuera de la misión propia de su 
Ministerio, tuvo especial encargo de cerciorarse si se 
cumple con la obligación respecto a la alimentación 
de los nativos y averiguar los nombre de aquellos 
que no tenían lejitimamente constituida la familia 
[…] Finalmente, los reclamos recibieron solución 
con arreglo a la Ley el mismo día de nuestra salida 
en lo que respecta a familias no lejitimadas y los 
casos de amancebamiento.”  
[As soon as we [the Baquedano] had docked in 
Hanga Roa, the Subdelegate of the Island and the 
representative of the Williamson Balfour Co. came 
aboard.… The officers began carrying out their 
assigned duties which were distributed as follows: 
Captain Fernandez, attention to the complaints 
of the natives, both written and verbal… First 
accountant Astorga, revision of the inventories of 
public property and the dependencies created in 
1917… Surgeon Merino: Examination and study 
of disease among the natives, as well as specifically 
leprosy and the lepers confined to the leper colony 
in order to determine if they are being cared for 
in accordance with the 1917 agreement of the 
Commission for the island; Mr. Fermandois, aside 
from the requirements of his own ministry, was 
specially charged with verifying the nutrition of the 
population and to track those, by name, who did not 
have a legitimately constituted family… Finally, all 
issues regarding illegitimate families and children 
received resolutions in accordance with the law on 
the day of our departure] (AMM 1921a). 
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However, State power found itself in a very different 
situation once those naval missions abandoned the 
island. In fact, the duties of the Maritime Subdelegate, 
the principal representative of the Chilean government 
on Rapa Nui, appeared very similar to those of the 
commanders: periodically informing the Maritime 
Ministry of the situation on the island, ensuring 
the implementation of government directives, and 
ensuring that the agreements between the Company 
and State established in 1917 were respected. Among 
the various other responsibilities that figured in the 
duties of the Subdelegate was also the resolution 
of conflicts that arose between the population of the 
island, local authorities, and the livestock company, 
as well as the administration of the offices of the civil 
registry, the police, the school, leper policies, ensuring 
the functioning of roads, public spaces, cemeteries, etc.
As was the case with the commanders during their 
brief visits to the island, the Subdelegate was also 
charged with the primary objective of regulating all 
aspects of the public and private lives of the Rapanui 
people. Among the many tasks included in this objective 
were the carrying out of periodic censuses of the 
population and inventories of public holdings, as well 
as the enforcement of a series of ordinances aimed at 
ensuring the cleanliness and hygiene of the indigenous 
people and at strengthening “good and moral habits”.7 
However, the actions of the Subdelegate were 
nearly always questioned, especially when no naval 
contingents were present on the island. Not only did 
the indigenous population resist his authority, but 
local authorities, including CEDIP administrators, also 
resisted his decisions and authority on occasion.8 These 
tensions sometimes came to light at certain opportune 
moments, which then allowed these authorities to 
seek solutions from the visiting naval commanders – 
solutions which were sometimes unfavorable to the 
Subdelegates themselves.
In the mid-1930s, Maritime Subdelegate Manuel 
Arturo Olalquiaga described one of these instances. 
Upset by the attitudes of naval officers towards him, he 
complained about them in the following terms: 
“Todo [esto] lo considero improcedente, y aún 
hasta si se quiere, es [indigno], porque […] estos 
procederes rebajan la Autoridad, poniéndola en 
situación ridicula, haciéndole hacer un papel 
verdaderamente despreciable, y siento el decirlo 
que esto pasa solo en la Isla de Pascua, pues en el 
Continente en cualquier Reten de Carabineros, que 
es atendido solo por un simple Sargento, el capitán 
del cuerpo, al hacer su visita, no vá a interrogar a los 
habitantes de alrededor del Reten, para preguntar de 
la conducta, ni si tienen reclamos en su contra, y si 
encuentra alguna falta en el Sargento, lo cambia y le 
aplica el castigo que merece, pero sin que nadie se 
dé cuenta de ello, esto se hace para no denigrar al 
Sargento, a la Autoridad […]; pero aquí sucede lo 
contrario y es por eso que los nativos abusan y no 
se les quita la mala costumbre, porque los mismos 
marinos tienen la culpa. […] habría sido preferible 
un puesto de portero de la Moneda, pues ese 
insignificante puesto, lo considero mas digno que el 
de Subdelegado de ésta Isla, aunque de todo lo que 
me ha pasado no me debía extrañar, porque en una 
comida que me dio de despedida mi hijo, Mayor de 
Carabineros José Manuel Olalquiaga Ibarra, un Sr. 
Comandante que se encontraba presente, me dijo 
que el puesto de Subdelegado de la Isla de Pascua no 
era nada, porque un Sargento de su escuadron tenía 
mas atribuciones, de lo que yo me quise ofender, sin 
saber que me estaban diciendo toda la verdad.”  
[All of this I consider out of line, and would go so far 
as to call it undignified… Because these procedures 
undercut the authorities, putting them in a ridiculous 
situation, forcing them to take on a truly despicable 
role… and it is worth stating that this only happens 
on Pascua, for at any police station on the continent, 
that is attended only by one simple sergeant, when 
his superior comes to make his rounds, he wouldn’t 
interrogate the nearby inhabitants to ask about the 
conduct of the official and then fire him and punish 
him should he find any complaints about that 
sergeant, they wouldn’t do this even if he had active 
complaints filed against him. This would be seen as 
a humiliation to the Sergeant, the Authority of the 
office. But here, this happens, and this is why the 
natives abuse the law, refuse to let go of their evil 
habits, because the navy themselves are guilty of 
this…. Being a doorman at the Moneda [the Palace 
of Government] would have been preferable, as even 
that insignificant post I consider more dignified than 
being Subdelegate of this island.  It now doesn’t 
seem that strange that at a farewell dinner hosted by 
my son, the Chief of Police Jose Manuel Olalquiaga 
Ibarra, a commander who was present at the event, 
told me that the position of Subdelegate of this island 
was nothing, because any sergeant of a squadron 
had more power. At the time I was offended, without 
realizing that what he was telling me was completely 
true] (AMM 1936b:24).
The weakness of the authority of the Maritime 
Subdelegate, and therefore the weakness of State 
structures on the island during this period, can be traced 
to various causes. On the one hand, it was due to the 
inexistence of an effective colonial policy from the State 
which translated into a near constant abandonment of 
the inhabitants of the island by the Chilean State. At the 
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level of local government institutions, this translated 
into a chronic lack of basic resources like medications, 
clothing, educational supplies, construction materials 
and agricultural implements. In fact, for the most part the 
only resources readily available to the Subdelegate were 
the public animals and lands (often in poor condition), 
and the resources that the CEDIP was required to 
provide according to the “Provisional Code”.9 
For example, during the administration of the 
Maritime Subdelegate Carlos A. Recabarren, many 
of his petitions to authorities on the continent didn’t 
even receive a response. In the case of the most urgent 
appeals, like those for medications or for seeds needed 
for planting, the Maritime Subdelegate himself ended 
up taking responsibility to acquire these goods during 
his sporadic journeys to Valparaíso. It was precisely 
Recabarren who mentioned the long delays, and perhaps 
the disinterest, of the government in responding to the 
various needs of the island: 
“[…] Desde que me hice cargo de mis puestos, 
constantemente hé pedido muchas cosas, a la 
Dirección del Territorio Marítimo de Valparaíso, para 
los habitantes de la Isla de Pascua, primeramente 
pedí un galpón para los leprosos qué costó 4,000$ 
[la leprosería había sido destruida por un incendio 
en 1926] y que lo conseguí siendo Jefe del Territorio 
Marítimo Don Santiago Lorca, Capitán de Navío, 
como también conseguí con él mismo […] para la 
Policía y otras cosas más; nuevamente he escrito 
al Señor Ministro de Marina, al Señor, Don Luis 
Escobar Molina, Jefe del apostadero naval de 
Valparaíso, al Señor Visitador de Escuelas de 
Valparaíso, para dos galpones para escuelas, qué son 
mui necesarios y muchas cosas útiles para la Isla, 
que poco a poco va llegando, y que mucho se me há 
prometido para la Isla de Pascua”. 
[Since taking charge of my responsibilities, I have 
constantly asked for many things from the Office 
of Maritime Territory in Valparaíso, things for the 
inhabitants of Easter Island. First, I asked for a 
shelter for the lepers that cost $4,000 [the previous 
leprosarium was destroyed by fire in 1926], that 
I received thanks to the fact that the chief of that 
institution was Don Santiago Lorca. Just as I also 
received with his help…. [goods] for the police and 
some more. I have now written again to the Maritime 
Minister, to Mr. Luis Escobar Molina, to the head of 
the port of Valparaíso, and to the Superintendent of 
Schools of Valparaíso for two shelters for the schools 
that are very necessary and many useful things for 
the Island, that little by little arrive, despite having 
been most promised for Easter Island] (AIV 1927: 
Folio 26-27(14)). 
Another cause of the structural weakness of the 
Chilean State on Rapa Nui, from the point of view of 
State authorities, can be traced to the inexistence of a 
solid coercive apparatus. The lack of a police force or 
presence of a stable armed force and the absence of 
penal system that fit the needs of the local government 
were permanent complaints of Chilean functionaries.10 
During this era, the only force the Subdelegate had at 
his command to use to impose order and authority was 
a somewhat squalid police force comprised entirely 
of indigenous Rapanui. And even that force couldn’t 
count on permanent funding by the Subdelegation 
and was dependent on the Company, which paid their 
salaries to prevent losses produced by cattle rustling, 
and on the charity of a few philanthropists dubbed the 
“Amigos de Pascua”:
“La actual Policía de la Isla de Pascua, es la misma 
de 1927. Se necesita ropa y otros elementos más, 
para que sea más respetada y al mismo tiempo 
tomen más interés y cumplir con los reglamentos 
de Policía, que existen en la Republica. He escrito 
sobre éste particular, al Señor Director del Territorio 
Marítimo y al jefe de Carabineros, Señor Don Cárlos 
R. Director, pidiendo, ropa zapatos, monturas, y 
todas las demás cosas que son necesarias para éste 
ramo. La Policía, actualmente y antes las paga la 
Cia Explotadora Isla de Pascua. Sus sueldos son los 
mismos que del año 1925, 1926, 1927 y el actual 
1928. El año 1926, mandó ropa para la Policia, el 
Señor Capitán de Navío, Don Santiago Lorca P.” 
[The Police force of the island is the same as it was 
in 1927. Clothing is needed as well as other things, 
so that they might be more respected and at the same 
time they may take more interest and can fulfill the 
requirements of the police that exist in the Republic. 
I have written about this issue to the Director of the 
Maritime Territory and the Chief of Police, as well as 
to Mr. Carlos R. Director, asking them for clothing, 
saddles, shoes, and all the other things necessary for 
this institution. The police, today as in the past, are 
paid by the Company. Their salaries are the same 
as they were in the years of 1925, 1926, 1927, and 
the current year of 1928. In 1926, the Navy Captain 
Santiago Lorca P. sent the clothing for the police] 
(AIV 1928a: Folio 31(16)-32).
At other times, when this police force was disbanded 
due to its inability to combat the theft of livestock from 
the Company, the Subdelegate simply lacked any way 
of ensuring that his orders were respected. Aware of 
this, Recabarren wrote a series of urgent petitions to 
the police force on the mainland during 1929:
9Rapa Nui Journal Vol. 27 (1) May 2013
“Dejo constancia en mi libro de apuntes diarios, 
los continuos robos de los habitantes de la Isla de 
Pascua; él poco respecto á la autoridad de la Isla, 
a la Cia Explotadora, etc. La Cia Explotadora me 
comunica seguido los robos que hay a diarios, sin 
poder pillar a los ladrones. Existia aquí una Policia 
pagada por la Cia Explotadora, se componía esta 
Policia, de 7 personas, que són, Juan Aracki, Juan 
Tepano y Matias Hotus que eran los jefes y de cuatro 
guardianes, sin pillar ningún ladrón; en vista que 
siempre continuaban los robos, la Cia Explotadora 
no pagó más á ésta Policia, desde el 31 de Enero 
de 1929. La población no tuvo guardianes, hasta 
el 1. de Abril que nombré uno para la vigilancia, 
etc, pagado por ésta Subdelegación Maritima, en 
la actualidad cuento con un solo guardia, siendo él 
censo último de 385 habitantes. En éstos momentos 
críticos para la Isla me hé apresurado escribir a mis 
jefes, Director Jeneral del Territorio Maritimo y otras 
personas más, pidiendo carabineros, para él órden 
público para evitar robos y castigar á los culpables, 
y que marche por él camino del bien, como tiene 
ordenado el Subdelegado Marítimo que suscribe.” 
[My diary of daily events testifies to the continual 
thefts carried out by the inhabitants of Easter Island; 
the little respect for the authorities on the Island and 
the Company. The Company reports to me regularly 
that there are daily robberies, without any possibility 
of finding the thieves. There used to be a police 
force on this island, paid for by the Company, which 
consisted of 7 men and were equally unable to stop 
the robberies. Juan Aracki, Juan Tepano, and Matias 
Hotus were the leaders and four guardians. In light 
of this the Company stopped paying this police force 
on the 31st of January, 1929. The population had no 
protection until the 1st of April, when I created a 
single guard paid for by this office of the Maritime 
Subdelegation. Today that force is actually made up 
of one person, as the previous census showed only 
385 inhabitants of the island. In these moments so 
critical for the island, I have pushed myself to write 
to my superiors, from the Director General of the 
Maritime Territory to others, asking for police, 
so that public order can be maintained, to stop 
these robberies, to punish those responsible, and 
so that the island can march forward in the right 
direction, responsibilities required by the Maritime 
Subdelegation] (AIV 1929:Folio 7538).
This problematic situation generated, in repeated 
instances, a power vacuum that allowed not only the 
inhabitants of the island to challenge the Subdelegate’s 
authority, but also allowed State functionaries to 
ignore his orders, the very same functionaries who 
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should have carried them out.  Conflicts like the bitter 
disputes between Recabarren and the Police Prefect 
Cupertino Martinez, who had arrived in 1930 to 
strengthen the police force on the island, are a good 
example of this dynamic.11 Likewise, around the 
mid-1930s, a conflict along these lines occurred; one 
that is worth mentioning. This one occurred between 
Olalquiaga and his predecessor, Hernán Cornejo, who 
had dedicated himself to sowing the seeds of distrust 
among the islanders against Olalquiaga; corralled in by 
the continual attacks, Olalquiaga lamented this conflict 
in his memoirs: 
“Como Uds. comprenderá, desde el primer momento 
mi antecesor se ensañó conmigo, hostilizándome 
en lo más mínimo que pudo, y no contento con 
todo esto, creó y posesionó a todos los nativos de 
una pésima atmósfera a mi persona, atmósfera que 
me ha orijinado un sinnúmero de contratiempos y 
transtornos, porque como les dijo a los nativos, que 
yo era un pobre diablo que venía a quitarles los 
plátanos y camotes, éstos no trepidaron en demostrar 
su desconfianza y desobediencia al suscrito.” 
[As you will understand, from the first moment my 
predecessor drew me in, antagonizing as best he 
could, and not being content with this, he created 
and charged the native population with an acidic 
atmosphere towards me, which has created an 
uncountable number of conflicts and disorder for 
me, because he told the natives that I was simply 
a miserable little devil that had come to steal their 
sweet potatoes and plantains, they don’t hesitate to 
demonstrate their distrust and disobedience of me] 
(AMM 1936a:3).
One of the formulas implemented by the Maritime 
Authority in an attempt to make State institutions 
more effective and legitimate was the inclusion of 
some islanders within the structures of those same 
institutions. In a short amount of time, these persons 
came to fulfill an important support role for the 
mechanisms of colonial power, without fully becoming 
functionaries of it. The relevance of these figures was 
underlined in 1921 in the report of the captain of the 
Baquedano about one of his visits to Rapa Nui:
“Al Sub-delegado [se refiere al Subdelegado 
Marítimo Exequiel Acuña] se le comunicó la órden 
cablegráfica que lo autorizaba a viajar en el buque 
para Valparaíso y en consecuencia determino 
nombrar Sub-Delegado Maritimo interino y Oficial 
del Rejistro Civil al Sr. Luis Zepeda […] así mismo, 
nombró jefe de los nativos y Comandante de Policia 
al más respetado de ellos, llamado Juan Tepano (ex-
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rey) que es querido y considerado por la mayoría 
de los pascuenses, para que actúe entre ellos y los 
dirija secundado por cuatro ayudantes de su propia 
elección […]” 
[To the Subdelegate [referring to Exequiel 
Acuña] the order was communicated by cable that 
authorized the trip to Valparaíso and as a result, I 
decided to name as interim Subdelegate and head of 
the Civil Registry Mr. Luis Zepeda… I also named 
as chief of the natives and commander of the police 
force, Juan Tepano, (former king) the most respected 
among them. He is loved and well-considered by the 
majority of the islanders. He is to act among them 
and will be supported by four helpers of his own 
choosing] (AMM 1921b). 
Aside from Juan Tepano, who occupied several 
different positions as police officer and functionary 
of the CEDIP, various other Rapanui participated 
actively in the Chilean institutional framework on the 
island, giving active support to State organizations, the 
livestock company, and the church.12 Some of these 
were: Juan Araki, Pedro Atán, as well as Mariana Atán 
and Andrés Chavez (teachers), among others.13 
The authorities’ need to incorporate indigenous 
inhabitants in Chilean institutional structures was also 
expressed in some of their efforts to create formal 
structures of indigenous representation. They sought 
to not only combat the indifference or resistance of 
the islanders to the State institutions (something very 
widespread), but also to generate spaces within which 
the Rapanui had a limited role of participation in local 
governance, even if only for appearances.14 
In 1921, while attempting to uproot the embedded 
antipathy of the islanders, Subdelegate Exequiel 
Acuña took up a proposal to create a court, a “Juzgado 
de Paz”, on the island comprised of islanders. The 
function of this court was limited to endorsing the 
decisions, punishments, and sanctions imposed by the 
Subdelegate, as well as ensuring the protection and 
development of “public morality”. While the proposal 
was rejected on the mainland, because it did not fit within 
the established legal norms of Chilean legislation, the 
proposal can still be understood as another attempt 
by the authorities to increase their legitimacy among 
the indigenous islanders.  This same motivation drove 
Subdelegate Olalquiaga, 15 years later, to designate 
Pedro Atán as the first Rapanui mayor (alcalde).15
“Para efectuar una labor eficaz, como también para 
introducir las normas de las ciudades y pueblos 
civilizados, resolví darles una conferencia sobre la 
Autoridad Comunal […] Una vez convencido que se 
habían posesionado bien de mi explicación, procedí 
ha hacer el nombramiento de Alcalde y llevar a cabo 
la elección de regidores […] Si bien es verdad que 
la labor desarrollada por estos hombres ha sido casi 
nula, es menester tomar en cuenta que es la primera 
vez que se constituye una Municipalidad en la Isla, 
razón fundamental para comprender que ellos no han 
podido en 4 meses desplegar todas sus actividades 
en su cometido, tanto por no estar perfectamente 
al corriente de sus deberes, como también por no 
contar con los medios elementales para ello.” 
[To make for more efficient work and to introduce 
the norms of civilized cities and towns, I resolved 
to give a conference about Communal Authority… 
Once I was convinced that they had grasped 
my explanation, I proceeded to name a Mayor 
[Alcalde] and to plan elections for other positions of 
leadership… If it can be said that the labor of these 
men has been nearly entirely negligible, it must 
be taken into account that it is the first time that a 
Municipality has been formed on this island. This 
is a fundamental reason that they have not, in the 
course of 4 months, been able to carry out all the 
activities in their mission. They are neither fully up 
to date on their duties nor do they have the resources 
for them] (AMM 1936a:12).
However, neither the weakness of State 
institutions nor the creation of these forms of Rapanui 
representation within official institutions impeded 
authorities from abusing the indigenous population. 
Such was the case of Subdelegate Acuña in the 1920s, 
who faced an investigation for the claims filed against 
him by officers on the Baquedano. 
“Vuestra señoria se sirve extractar las informaciones 
habidas por los Comandantes de la corbeta “Jeneral 
Baquedano” en contra del citado Sr. Acuña y termina 
en que es imposible su permanencia en este puesto. 
Aprovechando las circunstancias de encontrarse 
en ésta con permiso del inculpado, le he leido los 
cargos que existen en su contra, contestando lo 
siguiente; […] 3. Respecto al número 2, de abusos de 
administración y judiciales, dice que efectivamente 
hace mucho tiempo hizo azotar á algunos indígenas 
confesos de robos, pero que no continuó con esa 
práctica cuando se le hizo saber que ello no era 
correcto. 4. Sobre el cargo de usufructúo de víveres 
alimenticios pertenecientes a los indígenas, dice que 
jamas ha recibido víveres para suministrarlos a los 
habitantes de la isla y que por lo tanto este cargo 
carece en absoluto de fundamento. 5. Niega que haya 
hecho azotar á mujeres y niños y manifiesta que esos 
cargos son emanados de los mismos castigados por 
estar confesos de robos […]” 
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[Your Honor, I have reviewed the information 
provided by the Commanders of the “General 
Baquedano” in their charges against Mr. Acuña that 
ends by declaring the impossibility of his remaining 
in this position. Having taken advantage of the 
opportunity to be on the island with the permission 
of the accused, I have read to him the accusations 
and he has responded the following: … 3. With 
regards to point two, of abuse of the administrative 
and judicial systems, he said that effectively, some 
time ago, he had some indigenous people who had 
confessed to robbery flogged, but that this practice 
did not continue when he was made aware of the fact 
that it was incorrect. 4. Regarding the charge that he 
usurped the food of the indigenous populations, he 
said that he has never received food to be given out 
to the inhabitants of the island and because of this 
the charge lacks any basis. 5. He denies completely 
that he had women and children flogged and claims 
that these charges come from those very same people 
who had confessed to robberies and were punished] 
(AMM 1922). 
Because of these complaints, the Chilean Bishop 
and Military Vicar Rafael Edwards condemned Acuña 
as guilty of these charges. But far from immediately 
removing this abusive State functionary, this case would 
have ended with completely different consequences. 
Without addressing the problems of continued abuse of 
the indigenous population, the continental authorities 
decided to keep Acuña in his position of authority, 
basing their decision on his years of service, his gifts at 
managing the pharmacy, and, as if it wasn’t too much 
to say, his wonderful weaving talents.
“En vista de la autorización verbal dada por US. de 
dejar este asunto a mi determinación, estimo que 
por lo anteriormente expuesto y de que el señor 
Acuña ha prestado mas de seis años de servicios 
en el Ejército como Sarjento Enfermero; que tiene 
autorización suprema para rejentar boticas; que ha 
pasado por un curso de telar con el objeto de instruir 
en tejidos de lana a los indígenas; que su esposa 
tiene nombramiento supremo de Directora de la 
Escuela que mantiene el Estado en la isla y él de 
Ayudante, circunstancias todas éstas que a juicio del 
infrascrito hacen del señor Acuña y esposa personas 
adecuadas á los propósitos que en este sentido 
persigue el Supremo Gobierno; y, finalmente, que no 
todos los Comandantes que han formulado cargos 
en su contra lo han llamado para que presente sus 
descargos, como era natural, considero que por esta 
vez se le puede permitir continuar en su puesto; pero 
por cualquier nueva queja en su contra será motivo 
para exonerarlo de su empleo […]” 
Miguel Fuentes and Cristián Moreno Pakarati
[In light of the verbal authorization you gave, to 
leave this issue to my discretion, I have decided 
that, because of the previously discussed reasons, 
and because Mr. Acuña has given more than six 
years of service in the army as a Nurse Sergeant, 
has the top authorization to manage pharmacies, has 
passed a weaving course with the object to instruct 
wool weaving to the islanders, and because his wife 
is named the Head Director of the School that was 
maintained by the State on the island while he is 
the assistant, all of which are purposes that are in 
agreement with the Supreme Government’s aims, and 
because not all of the Commanders that formulated 
the charges against him have called him to present 
his case, as would be normal, I consider that for this 
time he should be allowed to retain his position, but 
should any further complaints arise, it would provide 
motive to remove him…] (AMM 1922).
What position did Bishop Edwards take on the 
issue? Similarly, while not referencing the issue of 
accusations of abuse of the indigenous population, 
he recommended, like the Chilean Government, that 
Acuña stay on the island. His reasoning was – that this 
functionary was the most fit for job – especially as he 
was recently married, something that was necessary in 
order to avoid any future scandals that could damage 
the external image of the republic.
“Mi querido almirante: Yo no creo a Acuña, el 
Subdelegado de Pascua, un tanto; pero, según mis 
informaciones ha sido de todos los empleados 
chilenos el menos deficiente en Pascua. Ahora él 
se ha casado con la señora que va de preceptora de 
modo que hay una garantía más de buena conducta 
futura. Mandar allá un soltero o un casado que se 
vaya solo será [para provocar] errores que pueden 
traernos denuevo amargas críticas del extranjero. 
Tengo cartas de dos sabios extranjeros […] Bryan y 
Skoltheag que se espresan de Acuña con agradecidos 
elogios después de su permanencia en Pascua. Por 
eso, yo le ruego que amoneste a Acuña pero que 
no lo cambie porque quedaremos peor de lo que 
[estamos]. Suyo, respetuosamente, Rafael Edwards.” 
[My dear Admiral, I do not believe Acuña, the 
Subdelegate for Pascua, even one bit. But, to my 
knowledge, of all the Chilean authorities that 
have been on the island, he has been the least 
deficient. He has now married a woman who will 
be the preceptor, which gives guarantees of future 
good conduct. Sending a single man there would 
only provoke errors and could bring us, again, 
bitter criticism from abroad. I have two letters 
from knowledgeable foreigners, Bryan [William 
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Allanson Bryan, economist of the CEDIP] and 
Skoltheag [sic, perhaps Carl Skottsberg?], who 
praise and thank Acuña after their stays on the 
island. Because of this, I ask that you warn Acuña, 
but do not remove him because we would then 
be worse off than we are now. Yours respectfully, 
Rafael Edwards] (AMM n.d.). 
As the relationship between the State and the 
Company consolidated, despite the legal disputes over 
lands, and formed a new alliance of interests oriented 
towards the exploitation of the island, the attitude of 
State authorities towards the indigenous inhabitants 
reproduced a regimen of colonial relations that differed 
very little from those that existed during the beginning 
of the 20th century. Along these lines, one of the 
things that definitely characterizes the State presence 
on the island during this period was nothing less than 
the duty and obligation of government authorities to 
“educate and instruct” the indigenous population. 
From the point of view of the Chilean functionaries, 
the indigenous society was understood to be “passive”, 
a mere receptor of the actions of State institutions, who 
were the only bearers of “civilization.”
However, it is necessary to clarify that while 
the internal politics on Rapa Nui were one thing, 
the Chilean geopolitical vision during the nebulous 
situation that followed the crisis of 1929 was another 
altogether. These two currents never fell into line 
during this period, coming at times to openly contradict 
each other. A good example of this contradiction is 
seen in the report sent on November 17, 1930 by the 
US Naval attaché to Chile, I.H. Mayfield, to the Office 
of US Naval Intelligence, in which the interest of Chile 
in selling the island because of its urgent economic 
needs was expressed for the first time (Attaché’s Office 
of Naval Intelligence Report 1930). Similar reports 
appeared in communications to the US Navy from the 
US Embassy in Chile on June 8th, 1937, and signed by 
A.S. Merril, in which he signals that the Commander 
of the Navy, Admiral Olegario Reyes del Rio proposed 
to the President of Chile, Arturo Alessandri Palma, 
and to the Minister of National Defense, Emilio Bello 
Codesido, “the sale or rental of the island” in order 
to obtain the financing needed to build two warships 
for the Chilean Navy. The island would be offered, 
according to the US documents, to the US, Germany, 
Great Britain and Japan (Attaché’s Office of Naval 
Intelligence Report 1937).  
In a somewhat contradictory move that perhaps 
rejected these sale projects of others within the 
government, President Alessandri declared the island 
a National Park via decree 103 on January 16, 1935. 
On the 23rd of June of the same year, the island was 
declared a Historic Monument, via decree 4536, 
and the extraction of archaeological remains from 
the island was prohibited. At the end of that year, a 
grand reforestation plan was announced, and Danish 
agricultural expert Georg Schlatzer was contracted 
by Minagri (the Ministry of Agriculture). On the 13th 
of February, 1936, the contract between the Company 
and Chile was renewed, establishing a new canon for 
the relationship finally ending the “Provisional Code”. 
Moreover, this established a new internal regimen of 
the regulation of life and work on the island. These 
are only a few examples of the incoherent geopolitical 
position of Chile in regards to the island towards the 
end of the 1917-1936 period. 
The “Compañía Explotadora” 
In order to clarify the role of the Company during the 
years of the “Provisional Code”, one has to analyze the 
conditions under which the CEDIP operated and the 
relationships it established with the Chilean State and 
the Rapanui community.
Thanks to the signing of the “Temperamento 
Provisorio” in 1917, the Company was exempt from 
the payment of annual rent to the State during these 
decades, and was free to use, at no cost to them, the 
lands and livestock on the island. At the same time, 
the separation of the roles of CEDIP manager and the 
Maritime Subdelegate liberated the Company from an 
important part of the responsibilities and costs of the 
local government. All of this made possible, among 
other things, a coexistence between the Company 
and islanders that was much less conflictive than it 
had been previously, a relationship that came to be 
redefined as one based primarily on the establishment 
of labor contracts and a series of charity policies.16 
However, at the same time, a key element of the 
Company’s development during this era was its 
fundamental role of support and backup for State 
institutions. Those weak State institutions, supported 
by the Company, fulfilled the mission of guaranteeing 
(instead of regulating) the development and conditions 
of the livestock cycle on the island. 
Untied from many of their previous responsibilities 
for the administration of the island’s governance, the 
CEDIP focused its energies on production, and in order 
to ensure this, on patronizing the Chilean authorities 
and institutions. By financing the activities of the 
Chilean authorities, many of whom were dependent 
on the Company’s monthly gifts of lamb and other 
goods, and by paying the salaries of the police force 
and periodically donating to the general populations, 
the Company consolidated its influence over State 
functionaries.17 Olalquiaga described his excellent 
and cordial relationship with the administrator of the 
Company, Mr.  Colin Morrison in 1936:
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“Cumpliendo instrucciones superiores con respecto 
a las buenas relaciones que era necesario mantener 
con la Administración de la Cia. Explotadora de Isla 
de Pascua, debo decir a Uds. que desde mi llegada 
a la Isla hemos mantenido una cordial amistad y 
una muta comprensión. […] Es así como durante 
mi permanencia en ésta Isla, jamás ha habido una 
pequeña dificultad entre esa Administración y ésta 
Subdelegación, y para toda medida que he tenido que 
tomar relacionada con la Compañía, la he tomado en 
completo acuerdo con Mr. Morrison, de manera que 
no hubieran inconvenientes y ellas fueran motivos de 
tropiezos en nuestra amistad y estrechas relaciones.”
[In accordance with instructions regarding the 
good relations that were necessary to maintain the 
administration of the Cia. Explotadora de Isla de 
Pascua, I should report that since my arrival to the 
island we have maintained a warm friendship and 
mutual comprehension. This is how it has been 
during my time on this island, never has there been 
any small difficulty between the administration and 
this Subdelegation, and for each measure I have had 
to take with regards to the Company, it has been 
made with the complete agreement of Mr. Morrison, 
in this way that there were no inconveniences that 
could prove to be a challenge to our friendship and 
direct relationship] (AMM 1936b:20). 
With this close alliance between the Company and 
the State at least within the island’s scenario during the 
years of the “Provisional Code”, the CEDIP started 
to focus on the Rapanui community. As mentioned 
previously, that relationship began to revolve around 
both the establishment of labor relations, commercial 
relations, including the facilitation of exchanges of 
corn and livestock with the indigenous population, and 
the Company’s charity programs that were aimed at the 
same population. Because of this shift in relations and 
this new margin of maneuverability, the Company was 
able to apply new methods of economic exploitation of 
the indigenous population, which at least appeared to 
be less oppressive, especially in comparison to those 
used in previous decades. 
The management of salaries, prices of goods brought 
from the mainland, and a monopoly on the sale of those 
goods in the Company store (located in Mataveri), were 
some of the forms preferred by the CEDIP that allowed 
them to profit from their relationship with the Rapanui 
population.18 These new methods of oppression and 
exploitation of the indigenous population might have 
appeared kinder at first glance than those unrolled 
under previous administrations, but they required the 
compliance of the (less kind) State institutions and 
functionaries as a precondition. 
Freed from the responsibility of directly 
confronting the indigenous resistance, the Company 
could present itself as a ‘modern company’ that 
benefited the community by offering permanent 
or temporary employment to a great portion of the 
population, thereby constructing for itself the image 
of a ‘social institution’ greatly concerned about the 
well-being of islanders. The positive image that the 
CEDIP tried to project was reinforced by the important 
interchange of products and livestock (especially corn, 
horses and cows) that occurred between islanders and 
the Company, especially from the 1930s onwards.19 
The Company not only took advantage of the 
signing of the “Temperamento” to use the land 
and livestock existent on the island without taking 
responsibility for them or paying for them for almost 
two decades, but they also failed to comply with 
sections of that very same agreement. In 1936, Chilean 
Deputy Carrasco spoke about this issue in the Congress 
while trying to intervene in the discussions about a new 
contract between the State and Williamson Balfour, 
and said the following:
“A pesar de que en esa ocasión [la firma del 
Temperamento] se le imponían a la Compañía 
Explotadora muy pocas obligaciones [entre otras, la 
construcción del ya mencionado lazareto] no les dio 
cumplimiento […] Ese lazareto se instaló apenas a 
1.000 metros escasos de las casas del pueblo y en 
terrenos de los nativos lo que constituye un peligro 
inminente de contagio. El artículo 70 obliga a la 
Compañía a llevar a la isla como administrador de 
sus intereses a “un chileno casado que se radique 
allí con su familia”, obligación que tampoco ha 
sido cumplida por la Compañía Explotadora. Esta 
concesión debió haber durado hasta el 19 de abril 
de 1929, fecha en que por decreto supremo número 
946 del Ministerio de Marina se le puso término. 
Sin embargo, señor Presidente, esta poderosa 
firma extranjera que parece disponer de una mano 
oculta que paraliza en la sombra lo que dispone ese 
decreto, hasta el 12 de noviembre de 1933 y hasta 
hoy día [alienta] la prolongación de una concesión 
que es atentatoria para nuestra soberanía e intereses 
nacionales. […] Si existieran razones morales que 
justificaran ciertas contemplaciones, estarían ellas de 
más compensadas con los 40 años de explotación de 
la isla que ha disfrutado esa Compañía con grandes 
utilidades pecuniaras, pero nunca se justificaría un 
nuevo arrendamiento; ya que si él se efectúa, se 
prolongarán por 20 años los abusos y explotaciones 
que esa firma extranjera ejerce sobre los nativos […]” 
[Despite the fact that on this occasion [the signing 
of the Code] the Company had very few obligations 
14Rapa Nui Journal Vol. 27 (1) May 2013
Towards a characterization of colonial power on Rapa Nui (1917-1936)
[among them the mentioned clinic], they did not 
fulfill any… This leper clinic was built only 1000 
meters from the houses of the town and on lands of 
the natives, a fact which presented an immediate risk 
of contagion. Article 70 obliged the Company to 
bring to the island for its administration a “married 
Chilean that would live there with their family”, an 
obligation which the Company has also failed to 
fulfill.  Their lease should have ended in the 19th 
of April, 1929, according to the Supreme decree 
number 946 of the Maritime Minister. Despite this, 
Mr. President, this powerful foreign firm appears to 
have a hidden force which paralyzes this decree in 
the shadows, up to the 12th of November of 1933, 
and up to this day, prolonging this concession that 
threatens our sovereignty and national interests. 
If moral reasons existed that could justify certain 
second thoughts, they would still be more than 
compensated by the 40 years of exploitation of the 
island that have been enjoyed by this Company with 
great financial capacity. Nothing justifies a new 
agreement, though, since if that is allowed, it would 
prolong by 20 years the abuses and exploitations that 
this foreign enterprise carries out on the natives] 
(AMM 1936a: 2647-2648). 
Once the terms of the “Provisional Code” expired 
in 1929, the CEDIP continued to benefit from the 
agreement. This permitted the Company to reap in 
fabulous profits, at the cost of public interests and the 
indigenous community. As a Maritime Ministry report 
from 1935 confirms: 
“Es de considerar, también, que la Compañía 
Explotadora de la Isla de Pascua se ha aprovechado 
gratuitamente de los terrenos y animales fiscales, 
de todo el aumento obtenido por la reproducción de 
los animales año tras año, de la lana, leche y demás 
beneficios de éstos desde el 7 de Noviembre de 
1916, fecha en que se puso término al arrendamiento 
otorgado por el Fisco al Sr. Enrique Merlet, o por 
lo menos desde el 5 de Mayo de 1917, fecha en 
que comenzó a regir el llamado temperamento 
provisorio […]” 
[It is worth considering as well, that the Company 
has taken advantage of the animals and public 
lands, of all the increases obtained through the 
reproduction of animals year after year, of the 
wool, milk and other benefits of the island free of 
charge since November 7, 1916, when the rental 
agreements authorized by the authorities to Enrique 
Merlet were terminated, or at least from the 5th of 
May 1917, the date when the Code went into effect] 
(AMM 1935).
In the case of the established relations between the 
Company and the Rapanui people, despite the “Code” 
and the new ‘social’ profile the Company tried to 
construct, multiple abuses of the indigenous people of 
the island continued (Comisión de Verdad Histórica y 
Nuevo Trato 2001). Continental functionaries typically 
took charge of denouncing these occurrences during 
and following their periodic trips to Rapa Nui. One 
example of this, included in a December 1921 report by 
an official on the Baquedano, mentioned the following: 
“Señor Comandante: En cumplimiento de la 
comisión que Ud. tuvo a bien confiarme, de 
averiguar si había, entre los naturales de la Isla 
de Pascua, algunas quejas o cargos contra la Casa 
Williamson Balfour y Co, e informarle por escrito, 
comunico a Ud. que, notificada las averiguaciones 
que el tiempo permitió, no constaté ningún cargo 
concreto contra de dicha Casa, aunque fue común y 
general la queja de que “los jornales están muy bajos 
y los precios de la tienda muy subidos”, pero sin dar 
pruebas claras de ninguna de las dos afirmaciones. 
En cuanto a la primera, creo que la Casa se ajusta 
al reglamento aprobado por el Supremo Gobierno; 
y en cuanto a la segunda, estimo necesario, para 
evitar probables alzas exageradas, que la autoridad 
convenga con la Casa una lista anual de precios, para 
todas las mercaderías que se venden a los naturales 
de la Isla, y que esta lista sea prontamente conocida 
por todos los interesados.” 
[Dear Commander: In order to fulfill the mission 
that you so greatly entrusted to me, of seeing if 
there existed, among the natives of the island, 
complaints or charges against the Williamson 
Balfour and Co., and to inform you in writing of my 
findings, I write to you that, in the time permitted, 
I found no concrete charge or complaint against 
the Company, although the generalized complaint 
existed that “wages were very low and that prices 
in the store very elevated”, but without any clear 
evidence. In regards to this first complaint, I believe 
the Company adjusts the wages in accordance with 
the regulations approved by the Government and in 
regards to the second, I deem it necessary that the 
Authorities and the Company make an annual list of 
prices, for all the goods that are sold to the natives, 
and that this list be promptly known to all interested 
parties] (AMM 1921c). 
Obviously, the complaints of the islanders were 
not taken seriously afterwards. Without knowing 
whether or not the list of prices mentioned were really 
established as such, the salaries of the indigenous 
population continued to be as low as they always had 
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been.20 It would have to be the Rapanui themselves 
who would later demand salary increases.
However, despite the fact that tensions between the 
Company and the Rapanui had diminished considerably 
during this period, this relationship was not free of 
conflict.  The constant complaints by administrators of 
the CEDIP regarding the theft of cattle by islanders, just 
like the periodic complaints by islanders regarding their 
working conditions and the high prices at the Company 
store, grew to develop into important social tensions.
This environment of latent conflict brought about 
the development of more serious conflicts between the 
Rapanui and the CEDIP. One of the most significant 
examples was the outbreak of a massive strike of 
workers in 1928, where the strikers were later joined 
by members of the police force. As Recabarren (AIV 
1928b) relates, most of the strikers demands were 
focused on an improvement in salaries and food 
rations, along with the participation of the islanders in 
the profits of the Company. 
“[…] Los nombrados más arriba [se refiere a 
los líderes de la huelga] se presentaron á ésta 
Subdelegación a las 2 P.M. del dia 5 de Agosto 
y espusieron los siguientes puntos. 1er Punto. 
Mejoramiento de sus jornales, hombres a razon de 
4$ diarios y su ración en café, almuerzo, y comida, 
horas de almuerzo 11 A.M. y comidas 5 P.M. 2 Punto. 
Mejoramiento de sus jornales para los niños y las 
mujeres 3$ diarios y sus raciones y horas como los 
demás hombres. 3. No entrarán a trabajar ninguna 
persona, si él Señor Administrador nó acepta nuestra 
petición. 4 Punto. Para los trabajos de la esquila, que 
se efectúa en el mes de Octubre y Noviembre, del 
presente año, se pide por él ciento de ovejunos 10$ 
ciento ó 100$ él mil, con sus respectivas raciones. 
5. Punto. Los que quieran trabajar voluntariamente, 
los trabajos de la administración y los del campo se 
opondrán, hásta el último hásta que la Cia arregle 
definitivamente. 6. Punto. Si la Cia acepta nuestras 
condiciones y la de todos los habitantes de ésta Isla, 
queda arreglado y todo el mundo se irá a trabajar 
tranquilos. 7. Punto. Quedan en ésta Subdelegación 
las firmas de los representantes de ésta guelga 
jeneral. Señor Administrador; agradeceré a ud 
contestar sobre éste particular. Sin otro particular 
tiene el agrado de saludar a ud su mui […] y amigo. 
Carlos A. Recabarrén.”
[Those named above [referring to the leaders of the 
strike] presented themselves at the Subdelegation 
at 2 pm of the 5th of August and pronounced the 
following demands. First, improvement of their 
daily wages, to $4 a day and their rations of coffee, 
lunch, and food at 11 am and another food break at 5 
pm. Second, improvements of the wages of women 
and children to $3 a day with rations at the same 
hours as the men. Third, no one would enter to work 
if the Administrator does not accept this request. 
Fourth, for the work of shearing that takes place 
in October and November they ask, for this year, 
$10 every hundred sheep or $100 every thousand 
along with their respective rations. Fifth, those that 
want to work voluntarily, either in administrative 
tasks or fieldwork will be resisted to the end, till 
the company makes definitive arrangements. Sixth, 
if the Company accepts our conditions and those 
of all the inhabitants of this island, everything will 
have been resolved and everyone will go back to 
work calmly. Seventh, the signatures of the strike 
representatives are left in this Subdelegation, we 
ask you to respond to this issue. With nothing else, 
I thank you … [signed] Carlos Recabarren] (AIV 
1928b:Folios 51(26)-52). 
This was not the only way in which the Rapanui 
tried to confront the unjust conditions of their lives. 
Effectively, the development of a series of rebellious 
practices on the part of the indigenous population 
became a key aspect of the social and political context 
during this period. Although these other measures did 
not reach the intensity of the indigenous uprisings of 
the previous century, these practices of indigenous 
resistance – among which we should mention various 
acts of disobedience, theft, insubordinations, and strikes 
– came to constitute a true and constant challenge to the 
actions of colonial powers on the island, represented by 
State institutions and the Company.
Conclusions
Due to the grave conflicts that had arisen between the 
Rapanui, the Company, and the Chilean State at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, both the CEDIP 
and the Chilean Government saw the creation of a 
series of important reforms on the island as necessary. 
In 1914, this impulse brought about the designation 
of a Maritime Subdelegate that was independent of 
the administrator of the CEDIP. Not long afterwards, 
they signed the “Provisional Code”, an agreement 
that laid the groundwork for a new form of political 
organization of the island. 
From that moment onwards, the apparatus of State 
power took on two visible faces.  On the one hand, the 
indolent political and administrative face was embodied 
by the institution of the Maritime Subdelegate, located 
in Hanga Roa, where State institutions like the Civil 
Registry and the Public School began to function. 
On the other hand, a second face emerged, one more 
economic in character and located in Mataveri, the 
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residence of the Company administrator and the site 
of the management of livestock production activities. 
While the duties of the Maritime Subdelegate included 
taking responsibility for the local government, thereby 
taking charge of the work of controlling the public 
and private lives of the islanders, the duties of the 
Company administrator were directed primarily at the 
productive realms of life, establishing relations with 
the indigenous population primarily through wage and 
commercial relations. 
Even with this, the State presence on Rapa 
Nui continued to be precarious. The years between 
1917 and 1936 were marked by the unveiling and 
implementation of a particular form of colonialism that 
lacked an effective colonial policy. The inexistence of a 
consistent State plan for populating and occupying the 
island, the extreme weakness of the State organizations 
and of the authority of the Maritime Subdelegate, 
graphically show us this point. 
However, despite this precariousness, the actions of 
the Chilean State during these years had a significant and 
powerful impact on the island. Indeed, the permanent 
presence of institutions charged with implementing 
different policies aimed at the regulation of the lives of 
the indigenous population, in education, urbanization, 
and ‘civilization’, left a long-standing footprint in 
the indigenous community. Likewise, the constant 
application of successive policies of social control and 
the ‘disciplining’ of the Rapanui way of life had fierce 
repercussions on the entire indigenous population.
The Company, thanks to the signed agreement, 
the “Code”, was exempt from the weight of rents they 
had previously been required to pay. This allowed 
them to freely use, without cost to them, the lands and 
livestock of Rapa Nui. On top of that, the separation 
of the duties of the Company administrator and those 
of the Maritime Subdelegate freed the Company from 
the responsibilities and costs of local governance. 
The Company was left then to develop a much less 
conflictive relationship with the islanders, and establish 
relationships with them that were primarily defined by 
work, wages and commercial relations, alongside a 
series of their own charity projects. 
A key element in the development of the Company 
during this period was its role of support for State 
organizations, with their mission to guarantee the 
conditions necessary for a healthy economic cycle on 
the island. Because of this, the CEDIP took charge of 
becoming patrons of the Chilean authorities, financing 
their activities, subsidizing the salaries of the police 
force, and periodically making large donations.
With these dynamics as their foundation, the 
Company was able to unroll a series of social controls 
and forms of exploitation of the Rapanui, many of which 
may appear to have been somewhat friendlier in their 
appearances than those used during the shameful and 
brutal administrations of Alberto Sánchez Manterola 
and Horacio Cooper. Control of salaries and prices for 
the goods brought from the mainland, as well as the 
Company store’s monopoly on the sale of these goods, 
became the new preferred methods for taking maximum 
advantage of their co-existence with the islanders. 
Some mention should be made of the role played 
by the groups of Rapanui islanders who collaborated 
with the Maritime Subdelegation and the Company. 
Although never coming to be functionaries at the 
service of the authorities, these groups exercised an 
important influence on the politics of the island, acting 
not just as agents of transmission of one or another 
pole of colonial power, but also many times playing an 
active role in the resolution of tensions between them 
and in changes in the balance of power on the island. 
The actions of these groups also tamed the stubborn 
colonial powers by diversifying the community’s 
approaches towards them. Especially important in 
this process of “domestication” were the marriages 
between Rapanui women and State authorities or 
Company employees.
During these decades, a system of government 
developed, acquiring a certain level of institutional 
complexity. In contrast to the preceding period, which 
had been characterized by an apparatus of power 
centralized in one authority, this period produced a 
branching out of this power structure, into two main 
spheres: the economic and the political-administrative, 
with their respective authorities in the administration 
of the CEDIP and the Maritime Subdelegation. 
We highlighted here the dynamic of constant 
feedback between these two spheres of colonial power, 
with the Subdelegation acting as an entity charged with 
the regulation of social relations and as a guarantor 
of the healthy development of the economic cycle, 
while the Company exercised patronage over State 
institutions and established a powerful influence over 
them. Moreover, while during previous decades the 
religious-institutional sphere had been an arena into 
which the interests of the indigenous community could 
easily permeate, during this period this sphere was 
substantially integrated into the framework of colonial 
power.21 The actions taken by Bishop Edwards and the 
work carried out by Father Englert in the mid-1930s 
both provide good examples of this new dynamic.
In the case of the permanent abuses of the 
indigenous population during this period that were 
carried out equally by Chilean functionaries and 
the Company, we find another important example 
of concordance between the colonial agents. Both 
spheres of colonial power shared a denial of Rapanui 
sovereignty over the island, as well as perception 
of the indigenous population that reduced them, 
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paradoxically, to the condition of foreigners in their 
own territory. Virtually corralled into the settlement of 
Hanga Roa, forbidden to leave the island, and obliged 
to accept the living conditions imposed by the regimen 
of livestock exploitation, the Rapanui were imagined 
by the colonial agents as a people incapable of ensuring 
their own “progress”. 
From the point of view of the Rapanui, the work 
of State institutions was a direct exercise of power, 
whether it appeared in the form of  actions taken by 
the Subdelegation, the naval missions, or the rest of 
the State institutions. In contrast, the CEDIP, the true 
heart of the colonial apparatus, became the ‘power 
behind the power’, sheltered behind the actions of State 
functionaries that acted in agreement with the Company, 
and seeping through the wage and commercial relations 
established between the Company and the community. 
This shift only made it more difficult for the 
Rapanui to identify the Company as one of the principal 
causes of the intense oppression that victimized them, 
because the Company morphed its social profile into a 
company offering work and commercial opportunities 
via exchange. This became a factor inhibiting the 
emergence of major uprising like the one that occurred 
in 1914, one that could have threatened the social 
and political structure on the island. Nonetheless, the 
precariousness of the island’s institutional structures 
and the continuation of important social tensions 
between the community and foreign agents made 
possible and fueled the development of diverse forms 
of indigenous resistance. In some cases, such as the 
general strike of 1928, these forms of resistance allowed 
the indigenous population to unite and confront both 
heads of colonial power that personified the coupling 
of State-Company, and thereby threatening one of the 
pillars of the colonial presence on Rapanui, the profits 
of the livestock operations.
Notes
1.  The “Compañía Explotadora de Isla de Pascua” will 
hereafter be referred to as either CEDIP or the Company. 
2.  While it is true that the alliance between the CEDIP 
and the State dealt an important blow to the indigenous 
movement led by Angata, it is necessary to mention 
that the rebellion achieved some strategic gains for the 
Rapanui, especially in the decrease of the power of the 
Company on the island.
3.  For a synthesis of the antecedents of the European and 
Chilean colonization of Rapa Nui,  see Cristino et al. 
1984. 
4.  For a deeper development of this affirmation, see Ortega 
1981 and  Salazar 2003.
5.  More than simply establishing a greater degree of 
territorial integration within the national framework 
during these moments, this situation is evidenced by 
the Government’s efforts to rent or sell the island (in 
response to the world crisis of 1929) to some world 
powers such as the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, or Japan. The first contacts were made during 
the government of Ibañez (1930), and almost through 
to the second government of Alessandri Palma (1937), 
with the only nations showing interest being the United 
States and Japan. In this sense, the transformation of 
the island into a National Park and Historic Monument 
during the 1930s can be understood to be an attempt to 
valorize the island for its later sale (see McCall 1995).
6.  One of the effects of the arrivals of these missions, and 
their threats of deportation and other punishments, was 
the generation of a climate of self-discipline (and self-
repression) within the indigenous population.
7.  For more information about this point, see AIV 1926, 
1927, 1928a.
8.  The self-discrediting of Subdelegates was partially due 
to their double-speak on morality. It is worth keeping 
in mind that they too had extramarital relations with 
indigenous women that resulted in numerous un-
recognized children on the island. 
9. The monthly contribution of 50 lambs, alongside the 
periodic donation of food, medicines and other goods 
by the Company were nearly the only stable resources 
disposable to State authorities.
10. During 1937, Subdelegate Olalquiaga revealed the 
precarious state of the prison and the inexistence of 
implements to prevent jailbreaks while describing his 
activities on Rapa Nui. He stated: “In light of the fact 
that the jail is in no way secure, I made sure it was 
reinforced and furthermore saw to it that an iron crossbar 
was installed along with the respective rings so that now 
the prisoners cannot escape. I also saw to it that a pair of 
handcuffs was made and 4 shackles” (AMM 1937).
11.  According to the testimony of Recabarren, Martinez had 
been guilty of numerous abuses of the island population, 
the CEDIP, and the State authorities. For details of this 
see AIV 1928b.
12.  Even when the State and the Catholic Church had been 
united, the latter couldn’t be reduced to merely a State 
institution. The actions of the Church during the period 
of catechist Nicolás Pakarati, which were always closer 
to the church in Tahiti, are a good example. However, the 
Catholic Church contributed much to the consolidation 
of the Chilean presence on Rapa Nui. Among other 
things, it collaborated in the fomenting of the sentiment 
for “national integration” among the indigenous 
population. The role played by the Church during these 
years by Bishop Edwards, and the work carried out by 
Father Englert from 1935 on, constitute good examples 
of this collaboration. 
13.  On a larger scale, we can also mention Rubén Hotus and 
Nicolás Pakomio as being within this group.
14. Nevertheless, it is true that certain personalities, like 
Juan Tepano, or at a later point Pedro Atán Pakomio, 
came to have a bit of influence within the structure of 
continental power established during these decades. On 
many occasions, this influence came to rival that of the 
two successive Maritime Subdelegates.
15.  Atán was designated (not elected) as the Rapanui mayor 
by the Subdelegate Manuel Olalquiaga, almost certainly 
in December 1935. 
16. Aside from those obligations established by the 
“Temperamento” (donations of 50 lambs a month to the 
Subdelegation, care of lepers, construction of a leper 
colony, and respecting the 2,000 hectares adjudicated to 
the indigenous population), the Company also made a 
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series of “social donations” of food, wood and medicine. 
They emphasized the giving out of pills imported from 
abroad for the lepers among these “social donations”. 
For details, see AIV 1926:Folios 1, 11(6),12; AIV 
1927:Folio23(12).
17.  For more on this subject, see AIV 1926, 1927, 1928a.
18.  Regarding this, Fischer (2005) tells us that the indigenous 
Rapanui grew accustomed to paying exorbitant prices 
for processed foods and other products that they did not 
need, especially when considering the previous patterns 
of nutrition and consumption on the island: tubers, tea, 
plantains, fish, chicken, lobster, fruits, etc… 
19.  As was the case with the groups of islanders that were 
close to the Chilean functionaries, there also existed a 
sector of Rapanui prone to have a better relationship 
with the CEDIP. Among this group we can mention 
the mestizos of the families Paoa Bornier, Tuki Kaituoe 
and later the children of the heads of the CEDIP, Percy 
Edmunds and Lachlan Mackinnon, with indigenous 
women (from the families Rapahango and Haoa). 
20.  While the salary of a worker on the continent reached 
around 60 pesos a week, the wages of a Rapanui worker 
didn’t surpass 100 pesos a year (see Hotus 2011).
21.  One example of this can been seen with the indigenous 
rebellion of 1914 and the role played by the church as a 
physical space that articulated the movement.  For more 
information (see Castro 2006).
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